It was estimated that it might be two or three days before bridges across the Rhine would be functioning and it would accordingly be necessary during that time to rely entirely on pontoon rafts and Buffaloes for ferrying over essential transport, supporting arms, ammunition and supplies. All vehicles, etc., were pre-loaded and given serial numbers and a priority list was prepared so that the vehicles, etc., could be sent over the river in the order in which they were required and called for by the Battalions on the far side. Special wireless communications were provided, on a Corps basis, to enable this system to be as flexible as possible and to ensure that any vehicle required by the bridgehead troops could be called for and sent across without delay.
By 21st March all necessary preparations had been made and all orders issued and the Brigade moved from Holland into Germany and into its allotted place in the Divisional marshalling area between Calcar and the Rhine. The next two days were spent, behind and under cover of a continuous smoke screen laid along the west bank of the river, in loading and marshalling into their assembly areas the large number of vehicles which would be required in connection with the operation and in briefing, in great detail, all the troops which were to take part in the operation under Brigade command.
At 18.00 hours on 23rd March Brigade headquarters was established in Honnopel a few hundred yards from the river bank, and by this time the preliminary bombardment of the enemy positions and gun lines had started. At 20.30 hours the Buffaloes, loaded with the two assault Battalions, began -moving forward towards the river from their assembly areas about half a mile back along previously selected and marked routes, and at Zero hour (21.00 hours) the Buffaloes carrying the leading companies of the assault Battalions entered the water.
Within six minutes (21.06 hours) reports reached Brigade headquarters that the leading companies of both Battalions had landed on the far bank and that the assault was going exactly as planned. A message of congratulations was received from the Corps Commander stating that 7th Black Watch were the first Allied troops to land on the far bank. By 23.00 hours both assault Battalions appeared to be getting on well and had taken most of their objectives, although isolated fighting was still going on, particularly in the 7th Black Watch sector. By this time both assault Battalions had -called for their essential fighting transport to be sent across the river and 1st Black Watch had almost completed their assembly on the far bank.
At midnight 1st Black Watch passed through 7th Argylls and by 02.30 hours on 24th March reported the capture of their first objective by their right forward company although their left forward company was still meeting very strong opposition at KI Esserden. A third company had been passed through on the right towards Speldrop and by 05.00 hours this company had almost completed its task although the rest of the Battalion wer'e still fighting for KI Esserden. Unfortunately at this stage Major R. Boyle, M.C., commanding the leading company, was killed. Before joining 1st Black Watch, a short time before the landing in Normandy, Major Boyle had seen much fighting with 2nd Black Watch in the Middle East.
Shortly after 06.00 hours 1st Black Watch reported that a strong counter-attack by enemy tanks and infantry had developed on Speldrop which had only been partially cleared of the enemy by this time, but that Kl Esslerden had now been captured. The situation in Speldrop further deteriorated and communications with the company there broke down completely.
Meanwhile 7th Black Watch had captured Kivitt and a counter-attack against them had been successfully repulsed. By 07.30 hours 7th Black Watch were firmly established in their area.
The D.D. tanks had been unfortunate in the landing beach allotted to them, which had proved to be unsuitable, with the result that by 08.00 hours only six tanks of the squadron had managed to extricate themselves from the river and half of these had already been committed with 1st Black Watch.
Brigade headquarters had been established on the far side of the river since 05.00 hours and the Brigade Commander, after visiting 1st Black Watch, ordered them to launch a further attack on Speldrop to join up with what remained of the right forward company which had now become isolated there. This attack started at 10.30 hours and was strenuously opposed by the enemy with S.P. guns and tanks. By 11.50 hours 1st Black Watch reported that they were in Speldrop and that, although the opposition was still very strong, they could hold on if more tanks could be got forward to support them quickly. All the tanks of the troop sent forward earlier to support the Battalion had already been knocked out while attempting to move forward to Spe1drop during the attack on it. Further attempts were now made to get some more tanks forward to Speldrop but had to be abandoned as all possible approaches· were mined or covered by enemy anti-tank guns. 1st Black Watch had been unable to gain contact with their who had reached Speldrap earlier in the morning and, as ammunition was running short and the Battalion had already suffered heavy casualties, the Brigade Commander ordered them to withdraw so that another attack could be launched with a fresh Battalion.
History Section Reference :
Rhine Crossing
Museum Reference :
Documents - Rhine Crossing