Gerbini Battle BDE Combs Account
Up to 0100hrs the fighting had been fierce and continuous with no respite. After this there was a comparative lull during which time Major Lindsay McDougall visited A coy and reported it established in position. Major Routledge, Commander of the Tank Sqn, made touch with Colonel Mathieson and the decision as to where the tanks ere to harbour was made. There were two alternatives, the wooded area at GERBINI or the re-entrant S.E. of GERBINI.. The wooded area at GERBINI was chosen as it was thought that this would give greater support to the infantry.
From 0100 hrs till dawn fighting continued sporadically with pockets of the enemy still resisting in the captured areas. At 0450 the Bde Comd ordered the Coy of 1 BW at the A.Tk ditch to clear the road into GERBINI for the A.Tk guns and a further Coy of 1 BW to take its place on the A.Tk ditch. He then proceeded with Colonel Sheil, 120 Fd Regt RA to the A.Tk ditch 742737. On arrival there, considerable enemy fire was being directed from the southern outskirts of GERBINI against the attacking Coy of 1 BW which was pinned down in the area 747745. It was decided then to send the carrier platoon, 4 A.Tk guns, and a portion of the transport of the 7 A&SH through the 7 BW who were to guide them to the road and rail junction 757745. The detachment under Captain Campbell reached the 7 A&SH; and were suitably dispersed. Meanwhile the second Coy of 1 BW had arrived and was ordered to clear the southern outskirts of GERBINI attacking by a covered approach from the S.E. The final stage of this attack was to be covered by smoke screen. The attack was successful but enemy small arms fire was still coming from locality B. The remaining 4 A.Tk guns of the 7 A&SH and two A.Tk guns of 1 BW were marshalled at the A.Tk ditch and sent into GERBINI under cover of a further smoke screen. The leading portee was blown up on a mine just SOUTH of GERBINI but the remainder reached their destination and were dispersed in areas D and C. Colonel Blair, Commanding the 1 BW, was at this time shot in the leg by a sniper and had to be evacuated. Major Baker-Baker was sent for and ordered to take command of 1 BW and to reorganise the GERBINI position in conjunction with & A&SH. News then came in that Colonel Mathieson and Major Routledge had been killed in the latter s tank while in the process of planning the attack on E.
At this stage the Bde Comd retuned to his HQ where he obtained permission from the Div Comd for 5 Camerons to come temporarily under his command. Colonel Sheil meanwhile went into GERBINI taking forward two fresh O.Ps and later returned to Bde HQ to say that reorganisation was continuing satisfactorily and the position was secure but that touch with A Coy had been lost.
The Bde Comd obtained authority from the Div Comd for the 5 Camerons (less one coy and four A.Tk guns holding the bridgehead 712714) to move to the area MASSA GERBINI to take the place of 1 BW which was now committed to operations in GERBINI. The Bde Comd then went to GERBINI where by this time (about 1000 hrs) the situation had deteriorated. A heavy counter-attack had been launched by the Germans from the N.E. Areas C and D were under heavy small arms fire. Two German armoured cars were brining down fire to bear on the southern outskirts of GERBINI from the S.W. and one or two S.P. guns or tanks were firing from area E which was at that time partially held by a Coy of 1BW. Three Sherman tanks had been hit by S.P. guns in the GERBINI woods; the remainder were head to tail on the road immediately SOUTH of GERBINI. The Bde Comd ordered one troop to take up hull down positions on the spur at E and the remainder to rally in dead ground immediately SOUTH of GERBINI prepared to cover any threat from the WEST. Two tanks of the troop sent to E, which had moved far out onto the open and level ground, were hit. The remaining tanks, some of which were incapacitated owing to rounds stuck in the barrel left the area of operations in a southerly direction. The Bde Comd seeing one troop of tanks behind the house at 759759 proceeded there and ordered the troops to deal with the armoured cars in area 7574. Two of the tanks of this troop were however incapacitated and this troop also withdrew. The Bde Comd then returned to his HQ and asked for another Sqn of Tanks to proceed to the bridgehead 7271 and arranged a counter attack tasks for the 5 Camerons, and for the Sqn of Tanks when they arrived.
While the Bde Comd was at his HQ Major Baker-Baker now the senior officer at GERBINI considered that the GERBINI position was becoming untenable. As he was unable, owing to his wireless set having broken down, to communicate with the Bde Comd, he decided on his own initiative to withdraw Southwards and hold the A.Tk ditch. This withdrawal he conducted in an orderly manner and very exhausted and battered Coys of 7 A&SH were extricated under cover of artillery concentrations. C Coy of 7 A&SH were still holding the position on the road and rail junction 756745 where under the command off C.S.M. Loudon, the Coy had held its position throughout the day and also destroyed two German armoured cars. This coy was ordered to withdraw through 7 BW. The 7 A&SH were withdrawn to rest and food in the DITTAINO bridgehead.
This action was magnificently fought by 7 A&SH from 2200hrs 20 July to 1100 hrs 21 jolly and there is no doubt that the Germans suffered as heavily if not more heavily in casualties than our own troops. The 7 A&SH ended the day with 8 officers and 415 men. A Coy had suffered heavy casualties and the whole company was missing. The Coy had apparently run out of ammunition as a message to this effect was sent to Bn HQ during the night.
History Section Reference :
Gerbini, Sicily
Museum Reference :
Documents - Sicily