Notes on the Battle of El Alamein
NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN
7TH BN. THE ARGYLL AND SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS
Although the place and date and even the probability of a night attack were kept as closely guarded secrets, it gradually became obvious that something of the kind must be afoot. In the month before the battle we took part in five full scale rehearsals, all slightly different, but all of approximately the same operation. Finally, during our spell in the sector of the front a little south of TEL EL EISA station which the three brigades held in turn, we were ordered to dig and camouflage slit trenches for the whole battalion about a mile behind the front line, nominally as a new defensive position, actually for our assembly area before the attack.
On 21st October the plan was divulged, an attack on the whole Army front with the main breakthrough for the Armour to be made in the North on the Alamein sector by the Australians (right), Highland (Centre) and New Zealand (Left) Divisions. Zero 2200hrs 23rd October 1942. During the night 22/23 Oct we moved forward into the assembly area and occupied the trenches we had dug. Everyone had his own food and water and his own trench to go to and the order was to lie hidden throughout the hours of daylight. It was a tedious day, but the manoeuvre was successful, and apparently undetected by the enemy, which was lucky as the whole area was crammed with hidden troops and guns and a day of intensive shelling or bombing would have been costly and a bad start to the battle. Actually not even a Stuka came over.
The transport meanwhile was being moved into its proper places for the battle. The most important was the A.1 Echelon which was to follow the Battalion's advance, led by a line of lights which we dropped as we went forward, as quickly as the Sappers could clear the gaps through the minefields, and was to be up in time to assist in the reorganisation of the final objective in readiness to meet the counter-attack which was expected at dawn on the 24th. It consisted of anti-tank guns, R.A. and our own Machine Guns, Mortars, R.E. Stores (mines etc) Signal Stores, Medical Stores, etc: and the Bren Carriers which did maid-of- work, carrying the reserve ammunition and tools for the rifle coys and at the same time towing Anti Tank two pounders. They did the job well but it was too much for them and eventually led to breakdowns.
Dark came about 7 o'clock on the 23rd and the assembly area then came to life. Everyone emerged from his hole, water bottles were filled, a hot meal was issued from three cook's trucks which had filtered forward at long intervals during the afternoon and final preparations were made. Each man wore a white St Andrew's cross on his back, every other one carried in addition his rifle a pick or a shovel ( this for the all important re-organisation) and everyone had a grenade or two in his pocket. At 2030 hours the march to the start line through prepared gaps in our own two minefields and out on to the tape, laid by the 5th Seaforth in No Man's Land as soon as darkness fell began. All went smoothly and by 2145 hours, the time at which the Infantry had to cross the line, the Battalion was formed up ready.
The Corps objectives were four lines to be captured in turn, The Green Line, The Red Line, The Black Line and The Blue Line. The attack was supported on a timed programme by tremendous artillery concentration on known or suspected enemy positions and the job of the Infantry was to keep up close behind this barrage, walk through and minefields met and deal with all the enemy localities concerned. The lines were more or less arbitrary and did not necessarily represent actual objectives on any particular battalion's front, but as they were Corps lines and used as the basis of the timing of the artillery programme careful pacing had to be done to know when they were reached and when it was time for the pauses on them to be observed.
The Division attacked with 153 and 154 Bdes. up. We had the 42nd on our right and the 51 Div Recce Regt and a sgn of tanks theoretically on out left (actually mines held them up to a great extent and their "lane" was not properly cleared until later) and beyond them the 7th B.W. We and the 1st Gordons alone had objectives on the Blue Line, a distance of about 4 1/2 miles. Ours a locality names STIRLING looked a formidable proposition to take on at the end of so long as advance with other smaller localities to be captures on the way, and actually we never reached it, which was, as events proved, probably just as well. But it considerably influenced our plan as one had to think all the time of how to keep enough fresh troops on hand to tackle this tough nut at the end. Air photos showed it as containing nine anti-tank guns, including two 88 cm. and thirty machine guns. Apart from that our lane was not expected to be strongly held by men, but it went straight into one of two "pockets" which Intelligence reports had already pointed out on the enemy front suggesting that they were intended to lure troops into as good "killing grounds": and such our one turned out to be. It was full of unsuspected mines, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, and was most effectively swept by artillery and a certain amount of machine gun fire. The infantry localities in it were called PAISLEY, RENFREW, MONS MEG, FALKIRK, GREENOCK, and finally STIRLING.
History Section Reference :
El Alamein
Museum Reference :
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders - North Africa
Documents - North Africa