Notes on the Battle of El Alamein
The situation next morning was not a peasant one. We had been told that a counter attack with tanks was the invariable rule and we were ill prepared to meet it. Apart from our small numbers, no transport, including anti-tank guns, mortars and machine guns had arrived (it turned out afterwards the unexpected depth of the minefields had slowed them down too much to manage it) we had no communication with the Brigade, both wireless sets having failed, and there was no one to be seen anywhere behind us. Altogether we felt rather out in the blue. However, no counter attack came and in the afternoon about four o'clock, all heralded, except for their barrage which opened on Bn H.Q. came the 2nd Seaforths, who pushed out beyond us till stopped by the wire and machine guns of STIRLING and dug in there, so greatly strengthening our position. This daylight attack of theirs, by two Coys was a magnificent and cheering sight and was carried out with the greatest dash and courage. We were given no news of it as we were still completely out of touch with the rear, and it turned out afterwards that owing to the machine gun fire no one was able to get up to us. Later in the evening, as even more cheering sight appeared, the first of our own tanks and with it what become a familiar experience it the next few days, that sitting in the middle of a tank battle and cowering in you trench while the opposing Armour hurled obscenity at one another apparently just above the level of your head. From the day it captured GREENOCK, 24th Oct. to the day it captured TEL EL AQQAQIR, 4th Nov. the battalion was, except for one night, in all its positions always under shell fire, and a good deal of the time under machine gun fire as well.
The casualties were, however, except in the actual attacks, extraordinarily small. In the latter stages the fire, though accurate, must have unobserved. Stuka raids were added when we left the front line, but they were directed at transport rather than troops and did little or no harm.
On Oct 25th orders came that we were to attack NAIRN, a long ridge in front of GREENOCK which provided the enemy with a good O.P. and was strong in anti tank guns and well protected by M.Gs and mortars. The whole direction had now rather swung to the south and STIRLING our original objective, having been attacked by tanks and pounded by guns, was to be taken in a simultaneous attack by the 5th B.W. Both attacks were to start at 2300 hours and both were to be silent, i.e. without artillery support. Our plan for NAIRN was to attack with "A", "B" and "D" Coy, now only about forty strong, and Bn H.Q. to hold the ground already won, in case anything went wrong, and to follow them on to the ridge, a distance of about 1,800 yards, on the success signal. "A" Coy much depleted, arrived back only an hour or two before taking part in the attack. All went well, until unfortunately there was a slight confusion and some noise on one part of the start line which caused one or two of the enemy M.Gs to open up before the troops had left. But all got off all right and the first enemy positions were taken without difficulty. As they neared the second positions however, the attack came under heavy crossing machinegun and mortar fire. "A" Coy suffered especially heavily, all their officers being hit. In spite of this, however, and although they converged rather than diverged as had been intended all the Coys pushed on and cleared every post they came to. A conservative estimate is that sixty or seventy of the enemy were killed. Twenty odd were taken prisoner. From the reports coming in, it looked as if the attack had run into something too strong and a set-back seemed probable. But then came a messages on the wireless from Capt. J.C.MEIKLEJOHN, O.C., "B" Coy to say that he had reached his objective and collected remainder of "A" and "D" Coys to him, giving him about a hundred men in all, and that he was holding on, but that the enemy seemed to had closed in behind him, and to have cut off all communications and to be threatening counter attack. The explanation seems to be that relief of the Italians, whom we had been disappointed to find in front of us in the first attack, by Germans was taking place. All the troops encountered in this attack were Boches. It has come out since that Rommel was not expecting our main push in the north, so he probably thought he could safely leave the northern sector to the Italians but changed his mind later.
Meanwhile the mortar fire shifted on to Bn H.Q. and the transport and anti tank guns which were again waiting for the gaps in the minefields to enable them to get forward. It soon became clear that MEIKLEJOHN was cut off. He reported that he was short of ammunition, so two carriers were sent off to try to find him, but they were unable to find him. Lt.A.J.A.STEWART then set off with the same two carriers, came within heaing distance of MEIKLEJOHN, but could not reach him on account of mines. Lt. F.A.SILLS, who was now the only officer left with MEIKLEJOHN unwounded, came out to try to guide him in but eventually ran into a party of Germans as there was a shout of "Up the Argylls" followed by the sound of grenades, and Lt SILLS had not been seen since. STEWART was to far off to help and MIEKLJOHN's party could not hear what happened. STEWART then returned to Bn H.Q. but set out on another attempt, this time with four carriers, two towing anti tank guns, but this attempt was again a failure and two of the carriers were blown up on the minefields. Daylight stopped further attempts. Meanwhile MEILKEJOHN and Major HUGH FORSTER, 126 Fd Regt R.A., our F.O.O. had been in wireless communication and through his wireless MEIKLEJOHN directed defensive fire which FORESTER put down round his position, thus probably saving him from being over-run. All the next day the position remained the same, further attempts to get ammunition, and now food and water also, through failed and it was only the day after that supplies eventually reached the garrison. All attempts accurately to place their position on the ridge by shell fire, verey light, etc. failed and thought they could see us we could not see them.
History Section Reference :
El Alamein
Museum Reference :
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders - North Africa
Documents - North Africa