Notes on the Battle of El Alamein
When reached they were found not only to be on their objective and in occupation of one and the main positions on NAIRN, but to be in excellent spirits, in spite of their trying experience. The whole thing was a great piece of work on the part of MEIKLEJOHN, who gave a magnificent display of leadership, courage and determination. Rather ironically while I was still swithering about risking my sound base by launching the last party of men of "C" Coy on to a two thousand yard objective, a motorised battalion attached to the tanks came up and occupied it and were the first friends that MEILKEJOHN saw. They left next morning with as little warning as they had come, leaving MEIKLEJOHN in the middle of a full fledged tank battle and still inaccessible.
NAIRN was occupied with "B" and "C" Coys (now Capt. D.E.YOUNG) forward on the ridge and "D" Coy (Capt. A.M.LESLIE) back. For a short time there was also an "H" Coy consisting of spare men of "HQ" Coy, and commanded by Lt. J.H.F. MORTON. MEIKLEJOHN was sent back to the Div. Rest Camp to recuperate and was sent from there to Hospital, and of the original Rifle Coy's Officers, YOUNG was then the only survivor. All the others, except MIEKLEJOHN, having become casualties, all wounded except J.L.GILMOUR killed and F.A.SILLS missing. At this time drafts of officers and men began to arrive, first our own re-inforcements , then from 2nd and 5th Seaforths, 2nd and 5th Camerons, and finally seventy from the 91st, bringing the battalion at the end of the battle to something like full strength again. Officers were still short and several of the newcomers were Cameronians. The four Coys were reformed, command of "A" Coy being given to Capt. G.V.SEYMOUR, R.S.F. The shortage of N.C.Os was a serious problem, so many having been lost in battle, and rapid promotion was inevitable, and in many cases well deserved.
Round the position on NAIRN we laid a complete system of minefields, the anti tank guns and machine guns and mortars were sited and one or two successful mortar shoots were conducted by telephone from observers pushed with two forward platoons over the crest. Shelling and occasional machine gunning, apparently on fixed lines, continued and there were some casualties, but not a great number. At this time the men were being worked pretty hard as they were often shelled very heavily by day and much of the night was spent in patrolling and laying the mine fields, which could not be done in daylight as they were under enemy observation and fire. A fighting patrol was sent out to destroy the most annoying machine gun post, but it was unsuccessful. It started badly as a joint patrol, half Argylls and half 7 B.W. The start was delayed by a threatened counterattack and finally when the patrol got within 30 yards of its objective it met high wire and fire was opened on it from several directions. Both officers were wounded, ours was Lieut. A.S. BOWDEN, and his patrol withdrew, Pte. SHIELDS carrying a wounded comrade all the way back to our lines. A reconnaissance patrol to discover the position of another M.G. post, which it was proposed to tackle, also came under fire as it approached. This post was to have been attacked, but before this could be done the battalion was relieved by Botha Regt. of the S. African Div., and sent out of the line for "rest".
The M.O. and his stretcher bearer did excellent work in both attacks, going everywhere without hesitation to pick up the wounded. Particularly good was their rescue work in the attack on NAIRN, where, led by the M.O., they went right into the heat of the fire and far up the ridge from post to post and cleared most every one of the wounded.
After the relief by the S. Africans, a long march brought us in the early hours of the morning to our rest area, and we settled in for the one and only time away from shell fire -"two or three days rest, canteens etc." were the last words from Brigade - Next morning orders came to move forward again into a Corps Reserve Area. 152 were to do an attack and 154 were to be handy in case anything went wrong. So back we went to sit on the edge of an uncleared minefield, on which one carrier and our second Intelligence truck the first was destroyed by shell fire) blew up, and to be shelled and "Stuka-ed" again. The next night we made another move forward and took over the reserve line behind 152 Brigade from the 24th New Zealand Regt.
Here we congratulated ourselves that we were at last to stay, but at about 1600 hours the Brigadier arrived to tell us we were to make a night attack on TEL EL AQQAQIR. The Coy Comds were quickly collected and, led by the Brigadier, we set out to reconnoitre, first along a circuitous track for about 4 miles then a short distance across the desert until in the gathering darkness we could see in the distance a line of telegraph poles which we knew to be about a thousand yards this side of our (invisible) objectives. A wandering gunner who was on the spot, informed us that the place in which we were was, most appropriately, the "N" in ??..(not readable).
Eventfully about 2200 hrs the Brigadier and I reached the Div.H.Q. to which we had been summoned, both feeling that an attack in the circumstances was not feasible but both prepared to have a short at it sooner than suggest unwillingness to go. There was, however, no talk of the cancellation which we more than half expected; far otherwise. The high ground at TEL EL AQQAQIR was the one thing still needed to make the final gap for the armours to get through and it must be taken. To help us, the battalion was to be given, all to itself, seven Field Regts of artillery, firing 240 rds per gun. The details of a plan were quickly made and set in motion, all based on this nebulous "N" in Depression".
History Section Reference :
El Alamein
Museum Reference :
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders - North Africa
Documents - North Africa