SECRET.
Z/544/G..
14 Aug 1943
This brief account of the Battle of GERBINI is forwarded, as the deductions (particularly number 2) may be of value to other Bdes in the Division and also it is hoped, the underlined portions of the deductions will be taken up with higher authority.
(signed T Rennie)
Brigadier,
Commander
154 Infantry Brigade
The Gerbini positions commanded not only the crossing of the River DITTAINO WEST of GERBINI but also provided flank protection for the German positions NORTH of GERBINI which denied the crossing of the River DITTAINO on the front of the Highland Division.
GERBINI itself formed part of the comparatively well-organised aerodrome defences. It was realised at the time that the defences were stronger than those which had previously been encountered.
During the early afternoon the Bde Comd discussed with the Div Comd a plan to attack the position. The object of this was to give greater depth to the Brigade position and by holding the feature possibly force the enemy to withdraw from his defences to the NORTH which had been holding up attempts to cross the DITTAINO. The Div Comd ordered that the provisional plan be made forthwith and a squadron of Tanks be placed under command of the Bde for the operation. A recce was carried out and the plan communicated to Comd Gps at Bde HQ at 1530hrs. The tank squadron had not arrived in time for this conference. A final Commanders Order Group was ordered for 1900hrs. At 16.30 hrs the Bde Comd left to attend a conference at Div HQ, as he left the Bde he met the tank Sqn Comd and told him he would get full details of the plan from the Brigade Major. At the Div conference at 1700hrs it was decided that the GERBINI attack would take place that night supported by two Fd Regts and one Med Bty. The artillery support for the attack had already been worked out by Lieut. Colonel Sheil, 120 Fd Regt with Comd 7 A&SH (the Bn that was to carry out the attack). The detailed arty fire plan is attached at Appendix A .
The plan for the attack was as follows. 7 A&SH were to carry out the attack (see marked map) and were to secure objectives A,B,C,D and E. They were to cross the start line SAIDA GERBINI 7575 at 2200 hrs. The attack was to be carried out with C Coy on the RIGHT who on reaching the railway were to turn N.W. (using the railway as axis) capturing areas A and B and consolidating on the latter. D Coy on the left were to turn WEST on reaching the road (using the road as axis) about 751745 and capture and reorganise on areas C and D.
Bn.HQ with B Coy were to move to area A, the latter prepared to patrol NE top cover the reorganisation of C Coy at B. A Coy was to be prepared in moonlight or at dawn to capture and clear the area E supported by the Sqn of Tanks. The Sqn of Tanks was to cover the reorganisation of 7 A&SH. A Coy of 1 BW, who were holding the A.Tk ditch 742737 was to clear the road NOTH into GERBINI for the carriers, A.Tk guns, and transport of 7 A&SH; which was to proceed by that route to GERBINI. The Sqn of Tanks was to proceed to 7 BW area and 7BW were to cover and guide them to the railway and road junction 757745 where they were to be taken over by 7 A&SH.; The arty was to support the attack by a timed programme of concentrations on A,B,C,D, E, and F. F was also to be a counter preparation task as it was thought that a counter attack might form up in this area were there was some cover. F.O.Os were attached to the Bn HQ 7A&SH;, 1 BW, and 7 BW and to the Sqn of Tanks. The 4.2 mortars were to support the attack by timed concentrations on C and E. Two platoons of M.Gs were to neutralise the Southern outskirts of GERBINI743745. The 1 BW less the Coy at 745737 was to hold the position previously vacated by 7 A&SH. The transport of 7 BW was to join that Bn and one Coy of that Bn was to be held ready to move in MT at half an hours notice.
Shortly after the advance started C Coy encountered heavy fire and all the officers became casualties. Colonel Mathieson, Commander 7 A&SH, decided to continue with his plan to avoid loosing the advantage of the arty concentration. The tanks eventually arrived about midnight. At this time A Coy were being subject to counter-attacks by enemy infantry and tanks, One troop of the Sqn was directed to support this Coy by firing at the flashes of enemy guns and L.M.Gs restored the situation. About midnight some enemy were seen moving to the southern outskirts of GERBINI 745745. D Coy sent two sections to clear up this area; as a result it transpired that the enemy were in considerable strength. Colonel Mathieson used his reserve Coy ( B Coy) to subdue the enemy in that area.
History Section Reference :
Gerbini, Sicily
Museum Reference :
Documents - Sicily