51HD 51HD




Operation "Totalise"


An Account by Major A McKinnon MC, 7th Argylls, written on 23rd August

On August 3rd. Commanding Officers were called to Bde for a conference where they were given the outline plan of the above operation in which 154 Bde were to play a prominent part. This plan was as follows.

51 Div. under the command of the Canadian Army and in conjunction with the 3rd Canadian Div. on their right were to make a deep penetration by night into the enemy posns due South of Caen and on gaining their objectives, strong Armoured formations were to pass through and make for Falaise and the South East. The operation was to be supported by very heavy bombing of the flanks and a medium barrage moving forward 100x in 1 minute. Various aids to keeping direction were to be used such as Bofors firing along the flanks and the artillery firing green lights onto the objectives. 154 Brigade were chosen as the spear head of the Division and each Bn. was to have one Armoured Regt. in support together with the various other supporting arms. The infantry were to be mounted on hard skinned vehs, half tracks and "Priests", with the guns removed. The order of march was 1 B.W. on the left, 7 A.&.S.H. on the right and 7 B.W. following 7 A.&.S.H. Objectives, St.Aignan, Cramesnil and Garcelles respectively. This entailed an advance into the enemy lines to a depth of approx 5000 metres. The Canadians were given objectives parallel to us on the right.

Obviously an operation of this nature required a lot of teeing up and practice on the ground and time was limited, the attack being scheduled to take place on the night of Tuesday 8th August. The first practice of forming up the column was not carried out until Saturday 5th August as the vehicles were not forthcoming until then which was only understandable as it must have required some pretty quick staff work to gather the vehs together, remove the guns from the "Priests" etc and get them out to Bns. A further practice was carried out that night in the Le Bissey area. We had by this time been told that the operation was to be put forward 24 hours to fit in with the bigger picture and so on Sunday 6th the Bn moved to its concentration area in the Powder Factory at Cormelles, South if Caen. There it was joined by the 144 R.T.R. who were to support us. During the night we were shelled by a heavy gun (probably 210 mm) and "B" Coy suffered 2 killed and ten wounded.

Morning of 7th August was spent tying up the final details, briefing the men, etc: and at 2100 hours the coln. started to form up just South of Cormelles . The order of march was as follows:

Two tps if tanks of "A" Sqn. four abreast with a navigator in each tp., 5 tps Flails in line ahead, R.E. Party, AVRE's, two armoured Bull dozers, SqnH.Q. of the tanks and the remains of "A" Sqn. Then followed another Sqn of tanks, the infantry Block and finally the reserve Sqn. of tanks. In all this comprised a very considerable number of vehs and, nose to back, the column stretched about 600 yds.

The forming up was carried out successfully at last light and the coln. moved off at about 2250 hrs to cross the S.L. by 2330. Bn. H.Q. were rather put out of their stride by the C.O's half track refusing to budge so he had to transfer to the 2 i/c's which was behind.

The barrage started at 2300 hrs and the bombing on the flanks about the same time and I believe the noise was terrific. Perhaps fortunately most of this was lost to us as our vehs effectively drowned most of it. Bombing was most accurate and no mistakes were made by the R.A.F.

All went well for about the first mile but then the column began to get rather spread out and vehs were no longer in station. About half way to the objective three of the leading tanks and a flail disappeared into a huge crater. The unfortunate part was that the tanks in question contained the navigators and there was considerable delay. It was here that the first enemy were met and "B" Coy came under fire from a Spandau and several hand grenades were thrown at one troop carrier, one landing inside which was promptly picked up and thrown out by Pte. Jarvie of "H.Q." Coy. (Sigs). Capt. Bate when dismounting to deal with this post was seriously wounded and had to be left behind in charge of a stretcher bearer (Pte. Cameron). The post was soon dealt with, 2 Germans being killed and 3 taken prisoner and the column started on. A rly. then had to be crossed and this further disrupted the coln. From here to the debussing pt. things were pretty confused with a few tanks burning here and there and Spandau fire on all sides. The debussing pt. was reached at about 0400 hrs and "B" Coy. collected itself by degrees and moved off to its objective which was the rear of the village of Cramesnil. This it took without much trouble, killing 5 Germans (incl. a C.S.M.) and taking seven prisoners. "A" Coy whose objective was rt. and forward of "B" Coy arrived at the debussing pt. in driblets as did "D" Coy who were to go left and forward of "B" Coy. However, both Coys soon collected themselves and reached their objectives successfully, this despite a heavy ground mist. "A" Coy had the stiffest opposition and Capt. McElwee and one other rank were killed attacking a Spandau post. By 0500 the Bn. had completed its job with eight Germans killed and about 35 taken prisoner. Consolidation was carried out and all was set for the expected counter attack. Bn. H.Q. was established in "B" Coy area and the tanks and S.P. guns were forward in support of the rifle Coys. Casualties were slight, being 1 Offr and 2 O.R's killed, 1 Offr wounded and 18 O.R's wounded. Eight tanks were knocked out and Major Lovibond, 2 i/c of the Regt. and their Sigs. Officer were killed, their tank being set on fire by a German "bazooka", on entering Cramesnil.

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History Section Reference :
Operation "Totalise", Breakout

Museum Reference :
Black Watch - Normandy
Documents - The Breakout